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Introduction 
The connection between the theory of public sector management and eco-
nomics is strong, albeit not always openly expressed. In this respect, issues that 
present themselves for discussion include the valuation of the public sector 
product, costs of public sector operations or establishing action objectives. These 
are the matters to which this paper is devoted. It is especially concerned with 
economic problems that emerge in connection with the concept of public value. 
It is a relatively new idea in the theory of public sector management (Alford and 
O’Flynn, 2009; Talbot, 2009), dating from the publication of M.H. Moore’s 
book Creating Public Value (Moore, 1995). Its influence on the theory of the 
public sector management is relatively weak. A review article from 2011 (Wil-
liams and Shearer, 2011) counted approximately 80 publications that raise this 
issue, which is a small number compared to the number of works on New Public 
Management or Public Governance. 
The concept of public value has the advantage of expressing explicitly the 
opinion about the manager’s action objectives in the public sector. Using it as an 
example, it is possible to discuss economic problems connected with setting 
action objectives in the public sector as well as certain related issues. Therefore, 
the objective of this study is not an analysis of the concept of public value from 
the perspective of public management, but a presentation of underlying econom-
ic problems of its premises and often imprecise phrasing. The thesis of this paper 
is a claim that the concept of public value cannot be reconciled with the neoclas-
sical paradigm in economics. 
What is public value? 
In Creating Public Value (Moore, 1995), the author explicitly distinguished 
between the two values that entities maximise – private value and public value. 
The notion of public value serves Moore as a criterion to assess public sector 
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managers’ performance and is analogous to the notion of private value. The ul-
timate measure of the performance of public sector managers is supposed to be 
the achieved public value. However, Creating Public Value is not entirely clear 
on defining public value and at least two basic understandings of the term can be 
distinguished. 
Initially, Moore introduces the concept through the analogy to private val-
ue, understood as the sales value of products over the cost of their production. In 
this view, public value is the effect of the production of goods and services of 
the public sector, reduced by the cost of their production. To calculate public 
value, it is therefore necessary to know the side of costs and value of what has 
been produced. While the side of costs does not raise many doubts, the problem 
we encounter is the difficulty in valuating the production of the public sector. In 
Moore’s view, such valuation is difficult due to the lack of independence of the 
recipients of public sector services. What it entails is the fact that decisions in 
this sector are made by the authorities on behalf of citizens, and financed by 
compulsory taxes. Meanwhile, independence – which we encounter on the free 
market – means that consumers make purchase decisions on their own, based on 
their own income and preferences. This lack of independence leads to disturbing 
the relationship between people’s preferences and decisions about the size and 
structure of public sector spending. Since consumers of public services are not 
independent, it is impossible to ascribe value to the public sector production. It is 
worthy of note that this outlook is different from the standard view adopted in 
economics, where to explain difficulties in the valuation of the public sector 
production, we refer to physical aspects of public goods (non-rival and non-
excludable) that prevent the emergence of markets. 
Moore solves this problem on the basis of the observation that in a sense, 
citizen’s decisions are, after all, voluntary, as they are made in the course of 
a democratic process. But “voluntarily” does not mean “individually”, as accord-
ing to the author of Creating Public Value, this is how (i.e. within a democratic 
process) a collective entity is created. ”It is the only way we know how to create 
a ‘we’ from a collection of free individuals” (Moore, 1995 p. 30). As this collec-
tive entity was created through citizens’ voluntary decisions, it can legitimately 
decide about the use of available resources. It follows that it is possible for it to 
determine the value of services provided by the state. Interestingly enough, thus 
we move to another understanding of public value – as a net surplus of the 
aforementioned collective entity. Based on Moore’s text, it is difficult to deter-
mine which of the presented ways of understanding public value is more im-
portant and what the relations between them are (Musialik & Musialik, 2015). 
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The problem of public value entity 
The definition of public value refers us to the question of who or what is the 
subject of this value, i.e. for whom public value constitutes worth, and who 
makes the decision to strive after this value. The aforementioned concept of the 
collective entity would suggest that it is the proper subject of public value. How-
ever, this conjecture does not move us further in the understanding of the dis-
cussed issue, as neither Moore’s nor his followers’ texts settle the matter of how 
this collective entity should be understood. In Creating Public Value, we can 
find at least three definitions of this notion. Firstly, it is a collective being exist-
ing independently of the members of the community. Secondly, a group of cer-
tain members of the community, in particular the politicians who are the recipi-
ents of actions taken by public sector managers. Thirdly, a collective entity is 
a kind of shortcut for techniques of transitioning from the preferences of individu-
al community members to collective decisions (Musialik & Musialik, 2013). 
One thing is certain, however – the notion of public value entity has strong 
collectivist connotations, because action objectives of public sector managers are 
set in a collective political process. Both Moore and many later authors put great 
emphasis on that point. This process must ensure the most accurate possible 
adaptation of what is collectively decided to individual preferences. It is the key 
aspect of the concept of public value, as full participation of subjects in the de-
termination of action objectives of the public sector is a condition of subjects’ 
independence, which, in turn, is the necessary condition for creating public value. 
In conclusion, it is noteworthy that this collective “we”, at least within the 
first understanding, is something entirely different from the entity whose behav-
iours are the object of description and explanation in neoclassical economics. 
Economic methodological individualism is juxtaposed to collectivism, perhaps not 
entirely defined, yet remaining in stark opposition to the assumption that the point 
of departure in the analysis of social and economic reality is an individual entity. 
The issue of deciphering and aggregation of preferences 
As early as 2002, Kelly, Mulgan and Muers (Kelly, Mulgan & Muers, 
2002), expanded the notion of public value, following the Moore’s second intui-
tion. They claim that in the public sphere, public value can be understood as 
value of services provided by public sector organisations, legal regulations, and 
all other actions taken by the government, reduced by the cost related to their 
production. The authors found an interesting way to solve the problem of meas-
uring public value. More or less explicitly they state that it is made within the 
decision-making process, whose object is the provision of public services and 
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production of public goods. If citizens are willing to make sacrifices, financial 
and others, in order to cause certain actions in the public sphere, then by defini-
tion these actions have public value. Instead of a measurement made before the 
decision is taken, here the measurement is made during the decision-making 
process. From this point of view, citizens’ preferences with regard to public 
goods and services are essential – as they are the factor influencing the decisions 
made. According to the cited authors, preferences are to be in some way deci-
phered and aggregated. Unfortunately, in their paper, the question of potential 
ways of deciphering is not systematically analysed; these are supposed to in-
clude e.g. statistical methods and media participation. Later works elaborate 
rather on the issue of public value measurement. This is made in various ways, 
including outlining the technical details of such a process (see for instance: 
Cowling, 2006; Hills, Sullivan, 2006; Mulgan, 2011). 
However, we should mention that the quest for methods to decipher prefer-
ences stems from a deep conviction about the deficiency of the traditional politi-
cal process that consists of decision-making executed by politicians elected in 
elections. It is an important thread, differentiating the concept of public value 
from the traditional management model, as well as new public management. In 
these older concepts, the objectives of public sector managers were supposed to 
be simply assigned by politicians, while the public sector was to be subsequently 
accountable for its execution. Meanwhile, it seems that theoreticians of public 
value, operating on the normative level, see the need for a direct connection of 
citizens and public sector institutions, so as to ultimately respond to the expecta-
tions of the former. As a matter of fact, this brings forth a very important ques-
tion from the perspective of public management: a question about relationships 
between its managers and the political sphere (Rhodes, Wanna, 2007; Alford, 
2008; Hartley, Alford & Hughes, 2015; Mintrom & Luetjens, 2015). 
A separate issue, connected with the problem of deciphering preferences, is 
shifting from individual preferences to social decisions. It seems that this ques-
tion is not regarded by the theoreticians of value as a problem. They focus on the 
political process of deciphering preferences (in a broader sense than it is tradi-
tionally understood), while the question whether a social decision can meet the 
requirements of cohesion and rationality is entirely disregarded. Therefore, they 
pass over important economic findings made by Arrow (1963), who questions 
the possibility of taking coherent social decisions.  
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The issue of multiplicity of public values 
Regardless of the ambiguities in Creating Public Value, it is certain that 
Moore distinguishes private value from public value, and what follows, there are 
at least two values within his concept that are the objective of entities’ actions. 
Benington goes further (Benington, 2009); firstly, he clearly differentiates 
between public value and individual satisfaction, and secondly, he distinguishes 
various kinds, or aspects of public value: 
• environmental value, 
• political value, 
• economic value, 
• social and cultural value, 
• public satisfaction. 
The description of the world of values made by Benington is more complex 
than what Moore proposes. Public value itself is not homogenous, as evidenced 
by the list above. Especially interesting is the fact that the author mentions pub-
lic satisfaction. We can guess that he replicated the idea abandoned by econom-
ics, of measuring welfare as a sum of individual satisfactions. Although it is not 
expressed explicitly, Benington’s concept seems to be based on the opposition of 
individual satisfaction and complex public value. It follows that it implicitly 
assumes the existence within the entity – whether it is understood individualisti-
cally of collectivistically – of separate individual and public preferences. 
Van der Wal and van Hout go even further (van der Wal & van Hout, 
2009). They claim that there are multiple public values which are grouped by 
public sphere entities in sets that serve as a basis for their actions. Moreover, 
these sets are usually different for each entity, and often lack internal coherence. 
It is clearly divergent from Moore’s initial concept which firstly has economic 
connotations – public value is modelled after consumer surplus, and secondly – 
there is only one. The idea of van der Wal and van Hout can be called the con-
cept of heterogeneous public value. 
All variants of the public value concept presented above are pluralistic, be-
cause they always include at least two values – public and private. When it 
comes to the pluralism of values, which is the key feature of the public value 
concept, a considerable theoretical problem appears, namely: inconsistency of 
thus described preferences of entities with the standard economic consumer the-
ory that explains people’s choices. According to this concept, the level of the so-
called utility of a given person can indeed be interpreted purely instrumentally, 
but it leaves no possibility for differentiating between separate private and public 
preferences. Mainstream economics assumes that preferences are described with 
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a single utility function, and that there is a single ordering of bundles of goods 
that fulfils the condition of coherency, i.e. consistency, transitivity, and reflexivi-
ty. The level of a given person’s utility may depend on other people’s bundles of 
goods or the level of public goods’ production, however, it is a single utility. 
Meanwhile, theoreticians of public value use the notions of private and public 
preferences differently – as if for the entity (whether it is understood individual-
istically of collectivistically), there existed two types of advantages – individual 
and public. 
The inconsistency with the theory of economics itself seems to be a suffi-
ciently acute problem – more on this subject below – but the problem is much 
deeper. Because we expect every reasonable theory concerning human behav-
iour to be able to explain their choices, or at least to assume such explanations 
can be provided by other sciences. The economic consumer theory, so in fact, 
a theory explaining human choices, may have numerous flaws, but it is a cohe-
sive theoretical device that constitutes a base for the remaining part of econom-
ics and other sciences. The concept of public value silently rejects this device, 
without offering anything in its place. A mere statement that people are motivat-
ed by various values and not only economic utility, opens up the field for inquir-
ies rather than closes the discussion. Because an important question appears: 
how people choose various bundles of goods, or more broadly, in a situation 
where they are motivated by different values? 
It is not a completely unstudied subject. On the margins of the economic 
consumer theory, there is an ongoing debate about the so-called multiple-utility 
concepts. Within this discussion, the supporters of the concept of multiple utili-
ty give two kinds of answers to this question. The first one states that it is possi-
ble to indicate a particular meta-ordering of values that allows the decision-
making mechanism to function. A good example of that is Thaler’s and Shefrin’s 
concept concerning the intertemporal choice (Thaler and Shefrin, 1981). The 
other one claims that a kind of “balancing act” occurs between values. This type 
of concepts is represented by the works of Margolis (Margolis, 1982), or Etzioni 
(Etzioni, 1988). Both answers are facing criticism, because as opponents of mul-
tiple-utility note, they in fact reduce the world of values to a single value, which 
is a return to the neoclassical concept. In the first case it is meta-value, founding 
meta-preferences. In the second one, it is claimed that the description of the 
mechanism of balancing assumes the equivalence of values in terms of a particu-
lar trait, and therefore it also reduces the world of values to a single principal 
value. The result of the aforementioned discussion notwithstanding, it needs to 
be acknowledged that its key premise – concerning the multiplicity of values and 
preferences – puts it beyond the framework of mainstream economics that is 
based on monism of utility, or the ordering of bundles of goods. 
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Summary – the problem of the assumed paradigm 
New public management seems to be based on economic principles stem-
ming from the neoclassical paradigm (O'Flynn, 2007; Musialik, 2015). The con-
cept of new public management, which is a normative proposition explaining 
how to manage the public sector, is based on the following economic theories: 
public choice theory (challenging the effectiveness of public sector actions), 
agency theory, transaction cost theory, and competition theory. We can add to 
that the key premises derived from economics: about the rationality of entities 
operating in the public sector, and individualism (Bozeman, 2007). Since from 
the perspective of methodology, the unification of various theories is a demand 
made toward science, then new public management, which is built upon main-
stream economics and cohesive with the current economic paradigm, fulfils this 
requirement in full. 
Meanwhile, it is easy to notice that the concept of public value which was 
intended by its creators as an alternative to new public management, is in many 
points contradictory to the neoclassical paradigm, or it adopts statements that 
cannot be proven on the grounds of this paradigm. Let us present some of them, 
without making any claims as to the completeness of the list below. 
1. The definition of public value (public values), as separate from private 
value is contradictory with the monism of mainstream economics. 
2. There is no description of the mechanism of selection of an entity 
motivated by multiple goals. 
3. More or less explicitly, studies elaborating on the idea of public value 
feature a collective entity. 
4. The source of the inability to valuate public sector services is not the 
nature of the produced goods, but the lack of consumers’ independence. 
5. Without sufficient evidence, the possibility of adequate deciphering and 
aggregation of entities’ preferences is assumed (shifting from individual 
preferences to social decisions). 
The concept of public value seems to be devoid of foundations. Moreover, 
some of its assumptions engender questions that do not have answers; and this 
last issue is crucial. It is because the contradiction, or lack of cohesion with the 
current economic paradigm is not in itself disqualifying. Nevertheless, a lack 
of an answer to important questions, including the one about the mechanism of 
making choices by the subjects of decisions, is a serious deficiency. 
Public management studies are applied sciences and as such, they will al-
ways need background knowledge. It follows that if one wants – like the sup-
porters of the public value concept who even claim that it is the new paradigm in 
public management (Stoker, 2006) – a complete rejection of the new public 
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management paradigm, they must wait for the change of the current economic 
paradigm. If we are to reject the neoclassical paradigm, we need something in its 
place. 
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